The Expanding Circle, Ethics Evolution and Moral Progress

When did we start caring about octopuses? When did concerns about animal welfare, the environment or morality also start to apply to creatures such as octopuses? Does it have to do with their intelligence, their ability to feel pain, or is it the feelings we get when we see them crammed into those breeding farms? The moral implications of octopus farming force us to question who or what we consider to be worthy of our attention and moral recognition. In his book The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution and Moral Progress, Peter Singer, a leading utilitarian ethicist, presents a foundational analysis of the moral considerations that underpin our everyday moral actions (Singer, 1981).

Singer wrote this book in response to E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, which was published in 1975 (Wilson, 1975). In this book, he argued that significant progress in genetics, biology and human behaviour meant that morality and our ethical foundation could be understood through a scientific lens based on empirical evidence. This would reduce philosophy, and more specifically ethics, from a realm of theoretical thought to a mere science of moral behaviour.

In response to this deterministic proposal, Singer starts recalling the naturalistic fallacy: one cannot derive values exclusively from facts. In other words, it is inappropriate to make a leap from how things are to how they should be. But is there really such an unbridgeable gap between facts and values? Singer argues that scientific facts and findings can inform our judgements about the best course of action, but they do not trigger our actions. In other words, facts cannot provide reasons for action: no fact can compel me to accept any value or conclusion about what I should or should not do. This decision is rooted in my values. To illustrate this point, Singer presents the following example in chapter three:

From a sociobiological perspective, our genes make us more attracted to those who are genetically close to us, like our family. But will this information determine what I decide to do with my money? This information may explain and predict what is usually done. However, it cannot prescribe or justify these courses of action, nor can it offer guidelines on what we should do. In order to decide which action is best, we need to find reasons.

But what does this have to do with octopuses, and how is it related to our morality? If we look at the headline again, we see that it gives reasons why they are unsuitable for such treatment. These include aspects such as their problem-solving skills, complex behaviours, and their ability to experience fear and stress. There may be an obvious biological, evolutionary, or emotional basis for what or who we like or dislike. However, it is our ability to reason that enables us to interpret a tail wag or a growl as approval or disapproval. When we ask, ‘Why did you do that?’, growls and licks become ethical judgements.

The evolution and history of our species illustrates how we have gradually expanded our sense of community: first to our immediate family and neighbours, and then to a wider community. These levels of prioritisation are known as ‘moral circles’ and have been discussed since ancient times. Peter Singer illustrates this concept by referencing a passage from Henry Sidgwick that outlines the moral obligations of a gentleman during that period.

According to Singer, our evolutionary history demonstrates our genuine concern for the welfare of those we deem worthy of our moral consideration. This may be due to our close relationships with them (family altruism), our expectation of something in return (reciprocal altruism), or because they are close to us (group altruism).

However, throughout history, we have also created moral divisions between ‘us’ (certain types of humans) and ‘them’ (other humans, non-human animals and natural entities). Yet these attempts have failed on numerous occasions. For example, we believed that we were the only civilised species until we encountered other equally advanced societies. We believed that only humans had language until other animals demonstrated complex communication skills. We thought that only humans had the capacity to feel, but evidence has proven otherwise.

So what makes us include these entities as worthy of our moral consideration? Reasons. It is evident that our emotions play a pivotal role in determining whether to include or exclude certain entities (for example, those that we find utterly loathsome or abhorrent, or those that we find aesthetically pleasing, amiable or endearing). In chapter four, Singer proposes the expanding of this moral circles.

According to Singer, this circle has traditionally expanded from the family and tribe to the nation and race, often driven by emotion and other factors (Singer, 1981, p. 121). We are now beginning to recognise that our obligations extend to all human beings. But why stop there? In his book Animal Liberation, Singer reasons that it is arbitrary to restrict the principle of equal consideration of interests to our own species, just as it would be to restrict it to our own race. There are reasons that demonstrate why all beings who may be affected by our actions should be included in the moral circle. This means, Singer says, that all beings capable of feeling pleasure or pain should be included.

And again, why stop there? An additional structure for inclusion might encompass plants or additional natural environmental entities. Although we have compelling reasons to act in this way today, we may have even more compelling reasons tomorrow that would justify including further entities.

As Singer points out, today’s enlightened thinking often turns out to be tomorrow’s hidebound conservatism (Singer, 1981, p. 121).

In conclusion, while it may be difficult to include these other entities in our inner circles, doing so could show that, like early humans, we are transcending our limited view of our own time.